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This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argu-
mentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure
of an agent’s collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets
of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the
formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching
modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can
combine her evidence in a ‘rational’ way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based
beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agent’s reasoning
abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her
beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should
not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.
1 Introduction
The concept of belief has been extensively studied in philosophy, logic and computer science. The repre-
sentations range from purely qualitative structures including the relational models with serial, transitive
and Euclidean relations (the KD45 representation in doxastic logic; [23, 30]), plausibility models [10, 13]
and topological models [3, 4, 5] to quantitative structures including the ranking-based plausibility rep-
resentation [35], Bayesian models using subjective probability functions and conditional probabilistic
spaces designed to represent conditional belief [9].
Despite the success of the early qualitative and quantitative approaches, most of them had one im-
portant disadvantage: they represent only what the agent believes, without dealing with the reasons,
justifications or evidence on which such beliefs are grounded.1 To remedy this shortcoming, the last
decade witnessed a number of different frameworks that can portray the evidence or justifications on
which different epistemic attitudes are based. For instance, the work in [8, 7], combines dynamic epis-
temic logic with justification logic in the tradition of [1] and [2] where justifications are syntactic terms.
In [12] and [11] a semantic approach is adopted, representing evidence as a set of possible worlds so
beliefs are defined by the maximally consistent ways in which evidence can be combined (so called
evidence models). The work in [5] follows the latter direction, adding a topological structure which rep-
resents the different ways in which the available pieces of evidence can be combined, and then using
topological notions to single out relevant sets of combined pieces of evidence.
The present contribution follows the mentioned topological approach [5], where we view arguments
as special types of evidence that an agent possesses. By combining the topological approach to evidence
logic with the tools from abstract argumentation theory [18], we can single out the sets of pieces of evi-
dence (or arguments) on which a new notion of belief grounded on arguments can be defined. This new
1An important exception are the so called truth maintenance systems [17, 26] which, inspired by the typical forms of
arguments in systems for inference in natural deduction, keep track of syntactic justifications.
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concept of grounded belief provides the bridge between an agent’s doxastic attitude and the arguments
she has at her disposal. While argumentation theorists such as [18] informally talk about the relation
between beliefs and arguments, the formalization of the details has only recently gained more attention
(e.g., [33, 22]). The approach in this paper is related to the line of work which studies abstract argumen-
tation theory by using the tools and techniques of modal logic [21, 14], and to the work by [22] which
introduces a notion of justified belief by combining doxastic logic and abstract argumentation theory.
Yet in contrast to the work on relational models for modal logic, we do turn to the topological semantics
of [5].
Due to its semantic nature, one might expect for this paper’s notion of grounded belief to be very
much like the notions of belief studied in relational and evidence models, but actually this is not the case.
Grounded beliefs turn out to be not closed under conjunction, which makes them more similar to the
probabilistic notions of belief as studied in [29] and [36]. In the final part of this paper we come back
to this analysis and provide a comparison between our concept of grounded belief and its quantitative
counterpart. From a philosophical perspective the lack of closure raises a number of interesting issues.
It shows how, in our framework, there is a clear difference between the agent’s reasoning abilities (i.e.,
the way she is able to combine her available evidence, represented by the topological structure) and the
closure properties of her beliefs (related to the strategy she uses to select the sets of combined evidence
on which her beliefs will be based). This relates to a point which is raised by [20] in the context of
the Lottery paradox. [20] describes a dividing line between processes of deductive reasoning (which are
closed under conjunction) and those which involve beliefs and are not closed under conjunction. While
we agree with Foley that there are essential differences in such reasoning patterns, our paper does show
how the two can be made formally precise and can moreover be united in a formal framework that defines
grounded beliefs on the basis of deductive reasoning processes for combining evidence.
Outline. Section 2 recalls the work on evidence and belief that our proposal is based on [12, 5]. Section
3 introduces our framework, defining our notion of belief grounded on arguments and comparing it
with the topological notion of evidence-based belief in [5]. Section 4 provides a sound and complete
logic characterizing the properties of our notion of belief. Section 5 compares our setting with the
probabilistic notion of belief, re-examining the criticism faced by notions of belief which are not closed
under conjunction. We conclude in Section 6, listing several directions for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall the basic concepts and definitions of the framework in [12] designed to present
evidence logic as well as the further topological development presented in [5].
Beliefs in Evidence Models The evidence an agent has for supporting her beliefs can be represented
in different ways. The proposal in [12] takes a semantic perspective and uses neighborhood models
[34, 31], a generalisation of relational models, in which a so-called neighborhood function assigns a
family of subsets of the domain to each possible world.2 3
2For our purposes, we work only with the so-called uniform evidence models in [12], in which the neighborhood function
is world-invariant.
3As Definition 2.1 shows, the concept of evidence represented in evidence models is rather abstract: a piece of evidence
is understood as a (non-empty) set of possible worlds. As it will be discussed, these pieces of evidence can be understood as
information the agent receives from external sources (observations, communication), and the closure properties the evidence
set might have can be understood as the different ways she can ‘extract’ further information from what she gets. For an in-depth
study about the different interpretations the term evidence and its ‘cousin’ justification might have, the reader is referred to [25]
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Definition 2.1 (Evidence model [12]). An evidence model is a tuple M = (X ,E0,V ) where X 6= /0 is
a set of possible worlds, E0 ⊆ 2X −{ /0} is a family of non-empty sets called pieces of evidence, and
V : Prop→ 2W is a valuation function for a given set Prop of atomic propositions. The family E0 is
required to include X (i.e. X ∈ E0).
Note that the above definition mentions two explicit constraints on evidence models: X is always in
the neighborhood (the whole domain is always a piece of evidence) but /0 is never there (evidence per se is
never contradictory). As these are the only possible constrains, it can happen that two pieces of evidence
in E0 are in conflict with each other (i.e., there might be e1,e2 ∈ E0 such that e1∩ e2 = /0). Moreover, in
this setting E0 is not required to satisfy any closure property, e.g. closure under finite/arbitrary unions
and/or intersections. Still, the lack of closure properties in the family of pieces of evidence does not
imply that the agent is not able to combine the evidence pieces in a meaningful way. Following the
terminology in [6, 5], we introduce the notion of a body of evidence:
Definition 2.2 (Body of evidence). Let M = (X ,E0,V ) be an evidence model. A body of evidence
F ⊆ E0 is a subfamily of E0 which has the finite intersection property.
4 A body of evidence is maximal if
it cannot be properly extended to any other body of evidence.
Next we indicate when a body of evidence supports a proposition P [6, 5]:
Definition 2.3 (Support of a proposition). LetM = (X ,E0,V ) be an evidence model. A body of evidence
F ⊆ E0 supports a proposition P if and only if
⋂
F ⊆ P.
The notion of belief à la van Benthem and Pacuit is based on the agent’s body of evidence. In [12],
an agent believes a proposition P⊆ X if and only if every maximal body of evidence F ⊆ E0 supports P
(i.e.,
⋂
F ⊆ P). According to this definition in evidence logic, the agent is able to combine her available
evidence in a maximally consistent way. Yet as explicitly indicated in [5], this does not mean that all her
beliefs will be consistent. Indeed, while the mentioned concept of belief works well in the finite case, it
can yield inconsistent beliefs in the infinite case:
Example 2.1. Consider the evidence model (N,E0 = {[n,+∞) | n ∈ N}, /0). Note how E0 itself is a body
of evidence and, moreover, is the unique maximal one. But
⋂
E0 = /0, and thus the agent believes /0.
Such examples have been the main motivation in [5] to provide an improved semantics for evidence-
based beliefs which changes the above given definition of van Benthem and Pacuit. Their revised concept
of belief is provided in the context of a topological semantics:
Topological Semantics for Beliefs The topological approach of [5] generalizes the setting of [12], as
it introduces a concept of belief which is always consistent. Moreover, the definitions it provides for
knowledge and other related epistemic notions have both epistemic and topological significance. We
limit ourselves here to the basic doxastic concept:
Definition 2.4 (Topological evidence model [5]). A topological evidence model M = (X ,E0,τE0 ,V )
extends an evidence model (X ,E0,V ) (Definition 2.1) with τE0 , the topology over X generated by E0.
5
For simplicity, and when no confusion arises, τE0 will be denoted simply by τ .
(for the first) and [32] (for the second).
4A family F ⊆ 2X has the finite intersection property when the intersection of every finite subset of F is non-empty.
5A topology over X 6= /0 is a family τ ⊆ 2X containing both X and /0, and closed under finite intersections and arbitrary
unions. The elements of a topology are called open sets. The topology generated by E ⊆ X is the smallest topology τE over X
such that E ⊆ τE .
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A topological evidence model extends an evidence model with a topology: a structure describing the
different ways in which the available pieces of evidence can be combined. Note that pieces of evidence
are modeled as opens in the topology; since a topology is closed under finite intersection, this fits our
intuition about the agent’s limited ability for combining evidence. Further reasons for modeling evidence
as opens can be found in [37, Chapter 2], [24] and [5]. In this setting, Baltag et al. provide an improved
version of evidence-based belief:
Definition 2.5 (Evidence-based belief [5]). Let M be a topological evidence model (X ,E0,τ ,V ). The
agent believes a proposition P⊆ X if and only if every non-empty open set can be ‘strengthened’ into an
open set supporting P (i.e., for any t ∈ τ \{ /0} there is t ′ ∈ τ \{ /0} such that t ′ ⊆ t and t ′ ⊆ P).
This notion of belief, which we call evidence-based belief (Bel), coincides with the concept of belief
à la van Benthem and Pacuit in evidence models when the domain is finite. However, Bel does remain
consistent in the infinite case (i.e., in topological evidence models, Bel /0= /0).
Based on these ingredients, the next section will extend the topological evidence models by adding
tools from formal argumentation theory [18].
3 Topological Argumentation Models
Recall how, in the above evidence models of [12], pieces of evidence may be in conflict (i.e., there may
be e1,e2 ∈ E0 such that e1∩e2 = /0). This is a natural assumption, as an agent may collect different pieces
of evidence (from, e.g., different sources) supporting contradictory facts. The crucial issue is then to find
reasonable ways for combining these pieces of evidence or, in other words, to single out meaningful
subsets of E0 that can be used to define a notion of belief. In the above mentioned approach, this role is
played by maximal bodies of evidence.
Something similar happens in the topological approach of [5]: even though combined pieces of
evidence may be in conflict (there may be t1, t2 ∈ τ such that t1 ∩ t2 = /0), the authors singled out those
whose complement is nowhere dense in order to define their topological notion of evidence-based belief.6
This suggests that different doxastic concepts can be provided by singling out alternative (but, of course,
reasonable) combined pieces of evidence.
Let us now focus on specific pieces of evidence that we can think of as examples of an agent’s
arguments. As readers familiar with the abstract argumentation theory of [18] know, its framework and
the various concepts that are defined upon it, can be understood as a collection of tools that allow us
to single out acceptable arguments (in our context, amounting to ‘acceptable’ pieces of evidence) from
all given arguments. In order to combine such tools with the semantic setting of topological evidence
models, one only needs to provide a reasonable definition of what it means for a piece of evidence (or
‘argument’) to attack another, where a piece of evidence is represented as a set of worlds. It is natural to
say that two pieces of evidence attack each other when they are in conflict, that is, when their intersection
is empty. For example, in a given topological evidence model,
for any t1, t2 ∈ τ \{ /0}: t1 and t2 attack each other iff t1∩ t2 = /0.
Note that in this example the attack is mutual (i.e., the attack relation is symmetric), yet that does not
always need to be the case.
From Conflict to Attack In this paragraph we use an attack relation that is not necessarily symmetric, but
it is still related to the mentioned notion of conflict.
6See [5] for the definition of dense, nowhere dense and other topological notions, and also for their epistemic interpretation.
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Definition 3.1 (Topological argumentation model). A topological argumentation modelM = (X ,E0,τE0 ,
֋,V ) extends a topological evidence model (X ,E0,τ ,V ) (Definition 2.4) with a relation֋ ⊆ (τ× τ),
called the attack relation on τ (with t1֋ t2 read as “t2 attacks t1”), which is required to satisfy the
following conditions:
1. for any t1, t2 ∈ τ: t1∩ t2 = /0 if and only if t1֋ t2 or t2֋ t1;
2. for any t, t1, t
′
1,∈ τ: if t1֋ t and t
′
1 ⊆ t1, then t
′
1֋ t;
3. for every t ∈ τ \{ /0}: /0֋ t and t 6֋ /0.
The first condition states that attack implies conflict (right to left), but also that, while conflict implies
attack, the implied attack does not need to be mutual (left to right). The second condition asks that, if t
attacks t1, then it should also attack any stronger t ′1. The last condition establishes that the empty set is
attacked by all non-empty opens, and that it does not attack any of them.7
3.1 Grounded Semantics for Argument-based Belief
The attack relation֋ defines, together with its domain τ , an attack graph Aτ = (τ ,֋). Given such a
structure, it is possible to use the tools from abstract argumentation theory in order to single out ‘good’
families of combined evidence (or arguments), which in turn will allow us to define a notion of belief
grounded in arguments. In order to do that, here is first a quick recollection of the basic concepts of
argumentation theory put forward in our framework:
Definition 3.2 (Characteristic (defense) function). Let M be a topological argumentation model, and
let Aτ = (τ ,֋) be the attack graph on τ . A subset T ⊆ τ is said to defend t ∈ τ if and only if any open
t ′ attacking t (i.e, for all t ′ ∈ τ such that t֋ t ′) is itself attacked by some open in T (i.e., there is t ′′ ∈ T
such that t ′֋ t ′′). The characteristic function of Aτ , denoted by dτ and also called the defense function,
receives a set of opens T ⊆ τ and returns the set of opens that are defended by T:
dτ(T ) := {t ∈ τ | t is defended by T}
When t ∈ dτ(T ), it is said that t is acceptable with respect to T .
The characteristic function dτ is monotonic [18, Lemma 19], and therefore it has a least fixed point
LFPτ (i.e., LFPτ is the smallest subset of τ satisfying LFPτ = dτ(LFPτ)). Note, then, how this least
fixed point is a set that can defend all (⊆) and only (⊇) its members against any attack. Moreover, it can
be proved that the set is also conflict-free (i.e., there are no t, t ′ ∈ LFPτ such that t֋ t ′). Due to these
properties, LFPτ provides an excellent candidate for the relevant family of open sets in τ over which
beliefs can be defined. (In abstract argumentation, LFPτ is called the grounded extension.) There are, of
course, other alternatives on which we can base beliefs: abstract argumentation theory defines also, e.g.,
the notions of an admissible set (a set that is conflict-free and all its arguments are acceptable with respect
to it), a complete set (one that is admissible and contains every acceptable argument with respect to it), a
preferred set (a maximal admissible set) and a stable set (a conflict-free set that attacks every argument
not in it). One of the reasons why the grounded set has been chosen is that, while the other alternatives
provide more than one set (there is, in general, more than one admissible/complete/preferred/stable set),
the grounded set is always unique; this guarantees that beliefs will be consistent, a property that is
typically desirable.8 One possible drawback of the grounded extension is that, in general, it may be
7In fact, as the first condition implies, it only attacks itself.
8Of course, consistency can be also achieved when some of the other mentioned sets are used, but this would require the
use of an external mechanism, and that might not be desirable for simplicity reasons.
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empty; however, this is not the case in our framework, as X is never attacked (it is in conflict only with
the empty set, which does not attack anybody) and thus it is always in LFPτ . Moreover, the grounded
extension is closely related to the topological notion of belief defined in [5], as we will show later. Thus
we propose the following definition of belief grounded on arguments:
Definition 3.3 (Grounded Belief). Let M be the topological argumentation model (X ,E0,τE0 ,֋,V ).
The agent believes a proposition P ⊆ X (notation: BP) if and only if there is an open set in LFPτ
supporting P, that is
BP if and only if ∃ f ∈ LFPτ : f ⊆ P
The definition says that the agent has grounded belief of P if and only if the agent has a “good"
argument for P which is a member of the least fixed point.
Properties of grounded beliefs From its definition (Definition 3.3) we observe that grounded beliefs are
upward-closed (BP and P ⊆ Q imply BQ). But a stronger claim also holds: LFPτ itself is closed
upwards.
Proposition 3.1. Given a topological argumentation model, if f ∈ LFPτ and f
′ ∈ τ is such that f ⊆ f ′,
then f ′ ∈ LFPτ .
However, grounded beliefs are not closed under conjunction. To illustrate this fact, consider the
topological argumentation model
M = ({1,2,3},E0 = {{1},{2},{3},{1,2},{2,3}},τ = 2X ,֋,V ) (1)
with֋ an attack relation in which singletons attack each other and {3}֋ {1,2}, {1}֋ {2,3}, {2}֋
{1,3} and {1,3}֋ {2}, and the empty set is attacked by any sets in τ , as shown in Figure 3.1.9 Thus,
according to the definition, LFPτ is {{1,2},{2,3},{1,2,3}}, a set that is not closed under intersection.
{1,3}
{1,2}
{2,3}
Figure 3.1: Grounded beliefs are not closed under conjunction.
To get a better grasp of the whole framework, consider the following scenario which can be modeled
by the above topological argumentation model.
Example 3.1. The zoo in Tom’s town bought a new animal and had it under exhibition. Tom was curious
about what the animal is, so he asked his colleagues. However, he got different answers from them. Some
told him that the animal was a penguin ({1}), some told him that the animal was a pterosaur ({2}) and
some told him that the animal was a bat ({3}). Moreover, two other colleagues he really trusts told him
that the animal could fly ({2,3}) and the animal was not a mammal ({1,2}). After receiving all these
9Attack edges involving the empty set are not drawn.
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pieces of information, Tom was very puzzled. After all, it was very hard to imagine that there could be
a pterosaur (although genetic technology has developed fast). So in such a situation, Tom believed that
the animal could fly and the animal was not a mammal, but he did not believe that the animal was a
pterosaur.
The lack of closure under conjunction does not indicate that our agent lacks formal reasoning abili-
ties, as is usually the case in weaker epistemic notions. Indeed, as the topology shows, our agent can put
her pieces of evidence together in a meaningful way. In section 5, we further elaborate on this distinction
between the agent’s reasoning abilities and the closure properties of her grounded beliefs. For now we
focus first on the reasons behind the failure of this closure property, by identifying additional conditions
under which the property holds.
Proposition 3.2. Let M be a topological argumentation model and Aτ = (τ ,֋) its attack graph.
• If֋ is transitive (i.e. for any t1, t2, t3 ∈ τ , t1֋ t2 and t2֋ t3 imply t1֋ t3), then LFPτ is closed
under intersections;
• If֋ is unambiguous (i.e. for any t1, t2, t3 ∈ τ , if t1֋ t2 and t2֋ t3, then t1 6֋ t3 and t3 6֋ t1),
then LFPτ is closed under intersections;
• If ֋ is symmetric (i.e. for any t1, t2 ∈ τ , if t1֋ t2 then t2 ֋ t1), then LFPτ is closed under
intersections.
Note here how when֋ is symmetric, our notion of belief boils down to the evidence-based belief
in topological evidence models of [5], and thus it is closed under conjunction. We will elaborate on this
point below. With respect to transitivity, one may wonder whether closure under conjunction still holds
under a weaker requirement that asks for the transitivity of the attack relation only when the involved
sets are in conflict (i.e., for any t1, t2, t3 ∈ τ , if t1֋ t2, t2֋ t3 and t1∩ t3 = /0, then t1֋ t3). We defer
the answer to this question till Section 5, where we compare our concept of grounded belief with a
probabilistic notion of belief.
We conclude this section with a comparison between our concept of grounded beliefs and the evi-
dence-based beliefs under the topological semantics of [5]. Recall that, in the latter, the agent believes
P (denoted by BelP) if and only if for any t ∈ τ \ { /0} there is t ′ ∈ τ \ { /0} such that t ′ ⊆ t and t ′ ⊆ P
(Definition 2.5). Moreover,
Definition 3.4 (Family of Bodies of evidence, Combined Evidence). Following [5],
• let F denote the family of all bodies of evidence (see Definition 2.2);
• let F finite denote the family of all finite bodies of evidence;
• define E as the family of the combined evidence given by finite bodies of evidence:
E := {
⋂
F ⊆ X | F ∈F finite}.
According to [5, Proposition 2], evidence-based beliefs can be equivalently defined as BelP if and
only if there is an open that supports P and is also consistent with any combined evidence given by finite
bodies of evidence (i.e., if and only if there is t ∈ τ such that t ⊆ P and t ∩ e 6= /0 for any e ∈ E).
Now, given a topological argumentation model M , let JM denote the set of opens that are consistent
with any combined evidence given by finite bodies, that is
JM := {t ∈ τ | ∀e ∈ E : e∩ t 6= /0} 10
10In [5], the elements of JM are called justifications.
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Note that if֋ in the topological argumentation model M is symmetric, then LFPτ = JM .
The following result shows that the notion of grounded belief is weaker than the evidence-based
belief of [5].
Proposition 3.3. Given any topological argumentation model M , JM ⊆ dτ( /0).
It follows from this proposition that JM ⊆ LFPτ , and thus BelP implies BP in any given topological
argumentation model. Therefore, grounded beliefs are weaker in the sense of being less restrictive and
therefore allow more formulas to be believed by the agent. In the next section we study the logic of
beliefs grounded on arguments.
4 The Logic of Beliefs Grounded on Arguments (ABBL)
This section studies the logic of the notion of belief grounded on arguments. In order to provide a
complete axiomatic characterization of the logic of grounded belief, we work for now with a language
that extends the propositional part with a belief operator.
Definition 4.1 (Language). The language L of ABBL is generated by the following grammar, where
p ∈ Prop.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ϕ |B ϕ
Definition 4.2 (Semantics). Given a topological argumentation model M = (X ,E0,τE0 ,֋,V ) and a
possible world x ∈ X, the truth condition of formulas in L is defined as usual for atomic propositions
and Boolean operators. For the grounded belief modality,
M ,x |= B ϕ iff there exists f ∈ LFPτ such that f ⊆ JϕKM
with JϕKM := {x ∈ X |M ,x |= ϕ} the set of ϕ-worlds in M .
Axiom System Table 1 shows the axiom system ABBS, which below (Theorem 4.1) will be shown to be
sound and complete for the language ABBL with respect to topological argumentation models.
Table 1: Axiom system ABBS for ABBL
Propositional Tautologies and Modus Ponens
4: B ϕ →BB ϕ 5: ¬B ϕ →B¬B ϕ
RE: from ϕ ↔ ψ infer B ϕ ↔B ψ D: B ϕ →¬B¬ϕ
M: B(ϕ ∧ψ)→B ϕ ∧B ψ N: B⊤
The axiom system ABBS extends the well-known axiom system EMN (the propositional fragment,
the RE rule and axioms M and N) with axioms 4, 5 and D. It is known that EMN is sound and complete
with respect to the class of neighborhood models that are supplemented (i.e., closed under conjunction
elimination or, equivalently, closed under supersets) and contain the unit (i.e., the domain is in the neigh-
borhood) [15]. This suggest a detour for proving the completeness result for our logic with respect to
topological argumentation models.
Theorem 4.1. For any ϕ ∈L and Φ⊆L ,
Φ ⊢ABBS ϕ if and only if Φ |= ϕ
where Φ ⊢ABBS ϕ indicates that ϕ is derivable from Φ in the axiom system ABBS and Φ |= ϕ indicates
that, for any topological argumentation model M and any x ∈ X, if M ,x |= Φ (i.e. M ,x |= φ for all
φ ∈Φ) then M ,x |= ϕ .
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Proof sketch. Soundness is straightforward; for completeness, the proof uses a modal equivalence result.
First, define a belief neighborhood model M as a uniform neighborhood model (X ,NB,V ) where the
neighborhood function NB ⊆ 2X satisfies the following conditions:
• X ∈ NB (NB contains the unit);
• if b ∈ NB, then b′ ∈ NB for any b′ such that b⊆ b′ (NB is closed under supersets);
• if b ∈ NB, then X \b /∈ NB (NB does not contain the complement of any of its elements).
In such structures, the semantic interpretation of a modality for this neighborhood-based belief is given
by
M,x |= Bϕ iff JϕKM ∈ NB
The following lemma states that every topological argumentation model gives raise to a modally
equivalent belief neighborhood model, and vice-versa. Since the axiom system ABBS is sound and
complete with respect to belief neighborhood models (see, e.g., [15]), it follows that the system is also
sound and complete with respect to topological argumentation models.
Lemma 4.1. For any topological argumentation model M = (X ,E0, τ ,֋,V ) there is a belief neigh-
borhood model M = (X ,NB,V ) with the same domain and atomic valuation such that M and M are
point-wise modally equivalent with respect to the language L (i.e. for any ϕ ∈ L and any x ∈ X,
M ,x |= ϕ if and only if M,x |= ϕ .) And vice versa.
For showing modal equivalence, the key is the following lemma:
Lemma 4.2. LFPτ = NB
Hence, M and M are modally equivalent.
Thus, our notion of grounded belief can be completely characterized by the axiom system ABBS.
5 Failure of Closure and Rational Belief
One of the distinctive features of our notion of grounded belief is its lack of closure under conjunction.
This feature is also a distinctive mark of the well-known probabilistic notion of belief, where belief is
interpreted as high enough probability (typically, above threshold 12 ). It is thus worthwhile to compare
the two approaches.
Definition 5.1 (Probabilistic Belief Model [29, 36]). A probabilistic belief model is a tupleM= (X ,µ ,V )
where X is a countable space and µ : 2X → [0,1] is a probability function satisfying Kolmogorov’s
Axioms: (1) µ(Q)≥ 0 for any Q ⊆ X, (2) µ(X) = 1, and (3) for any countable sequence of disjoint sets
S1,S2, . . ., µ(
⋃∞
i=1 Si) = Σ
∞
i=1µ(Si).
In this probabilistic belief model, µ is interpreted as agent’s credence function which measures the
agent’s credence in each proposition. Hence credible enough propositions can be taken to represent the
agent’s beliefs, where “credible enough" means “above some threshold". In order to illustrate the relation
between our concept of grounded belief and this quantitative counterpart, we consider the threshold to
be 0.5. Thus, the concept of probabilistic belief that we consider in this paper is defined as
M,x |= Bϕ iff µ(JϕKM)> 0.5
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It is important to note that the axiom system ABBS is sound with respect to the probabilistic be-
lief model. Moreover, for any probabilistic belief model we can construct a modally equivalent belief
neighborhood model (see the proof of Theorem 4.1): it is enough to put in the neighbourhood NB all
subsets of the domain whose probability is greater than 0.5, i.e. NB = {S⊆ X | µ(S)> 0.5}. Given Kol-
mogorov’s axioms, the resulting structure indeed satisfies the belief neighborhood requirements. Even
more: by Lemma 4.1, we can build a topological argumentation model from the belief neighborhood
model, which is modally equivalent to the belief neighborhood model and thus modally equivalent to the
probabilistic belief model. However, not every topological argumentation model has a modally equiva-
lent probabilistic belief model. This is because the axiom system ABBS is sound but not complete with
respect to the probabilistic belief model (c.f. [27, Section 3.1], [29] and [36]).
Thus, probabilistic belief can be seen as a special form of grounded belief, in the sense that the
former can be defined through a special attack relation on 2X : for any e,e′ ∈ 2X , define e֋µ e′ if and
only if e∩ e′ = /0 and µ(e) 6 µ(e′). This attack relation satisfies extra conditions, for example, for any
e1,e2,e3 ∈ 2X , if e1֋ e2, e2֋ e3 and e1∩ e3 = /0, then e1֋ e3. Since the probabilistic notion of belief
is not closed under conjunction either, this extra condition does not save the failure of closure under
conjunction, which answers the question we posed in Section 2.
Philosophical Debate. Let us re-examine one of the most important criticisms faced by probabilistic
beliefs from the perspective of our topological argumentation models. The criticism is based on the
conjunction rule which states that if it is ‘rational’ for an agent to believe ϕ and it is ‘rational’ to believe
ψ , then it is ‘rational’ to believe ϕ and ψ . As stated in [20],
there are [. . . ] prima facie worries associated with rejecting the rule, the most fundamental
of which is that if we are not required on pains of irrationality to believe the conjunction of
propositions that we rationally believe, we might seem to lose some of our most powerful
argumentative and deliberative tools. (p.42)
Thus, according to this (which [20] actually criticizes), a rational agent should follow the conjunction
rule. Since probabilistic beliefs violate the rule, philosophers have debated whether probabilistic beliefs
are good candidates for representing a rational concept of belief. In this discussion it is essential to
note that if “rational" is viewed as the willingness and capability of following logical rules, it implicitly
burdens belief with a requirement about the agent’s ability of deductive reasoning.11 In [20], the author
argues not only that this worry is misplaced, but also that beliefs should not be burdened with the agents’
deductive reasoning abilities. Note that Foley proposes a clear distinction between two reasoning pro-
cesses, one involving an agent’s beliefs (not closed under conjunction) and deductive processes (which
are closed under conjunction). What our proposal shows is that the two processes are distinct but can be
united in one formal framework.
The topological argumentation model shows how the notion of grounded belief is based on the
agents’ topology of evidence and the attack relation on the topology. So on the one hand, the agent
modelled by a topological argumentation model is a powerful logician: she can generate a full topology
from her collections of pieces of evidence. On the other hand, this logician’ grounded belief does not
follow the conjunction rule. So even if the agent has a good argument/reason to believe ϕ and a good
argument/reason to believe ψ , she may not have a good argument/reason to believe ϕ ∧ψ . In contrast to
many probabilistic belief models where these parts are hidden, our setting makes the different processes
explicit.
11Our discussion does not exclude the possibility that ‘rationality’ may well require more than simply reasoning in a logical
way. But if extra constraints are imposed the formal setting is bound to change as well.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper studies a notion of grounded belief. It does so by applying ideas from both abstract argumen-
tation theory and the topological semantics for evidence.
From the perspective of abstract argumentation theory, our work can be seen as an attempt of giving
structure to the otherwise abstract arguments in an attack graph. Here arguments are instantiated as
sets of possible worlds, and thus we can use logical tools to define not only which propositions they
support, but also when one of them attacks another. From the perspective of the topological semantics
for evidence, our work provides a generalization of the conflict relation between pieces of evidence. The
integration of these ingredients from two different fields brings to fruition a notion of belief grounded on
arguments whose logical behavior is proved to be characterized by the axiom system ABBS. This notion
is compared with other forms of belief, including the evidence-based belief of [5] and the probabilistic
notion of belief in [29] and [36].
One of the most intriguing features of the introduced concept of grounded belief is its failure of
closure under conjunction. In the philosophical literature, this failure is widely taken as a failure of
rationality, especially when it comes down to the agent’s beliefs. However, as our setting shows, even
if the conjunction rule is adopted by the agent on the level of reasoning about evidence or arguments, it
does not need to be adopted to form new beliefs.
In future work we extend our formal language to include operators that address the agent’s arguments
explicitly. While our current restricted language allows us to characterize the behavior of our notion of
belief, it does lack the expressive power to talk about the relationship between beliefs and the arguments
supporting it. Another dimension worthwhile to explore further is the understanding of argumentation
not as a single agent’s inner reasoning mechanism, but rather as a social process that involves several
agents. There exists work in argumentation theory dedicated to this dimension, as the study of methods
for merging different attack graphs [16] shows. This line of work can further be related to the recent
developments in social choice theory [19]. In our context, the question of merging different agent’s
attack graphs can shed new light at group-related notions, in particular, distributed belief, which can then
be understood from the perspective of abstract argumentation theory.
Finally, while we have restricted our attention to the concept of grounded belief, epistemologists
will be interested to see a connection to the seminal studies of knowledge, belief, justifications and
their relation (e.g., [28], where knowledge is understood as belief with a correct justification that cannot
be defeated by any further true justification). There exist new proposals in this direction (e.g., [5]),
which, with the help of argumentation theory can shed more light on different epistemic theories and, in
particular, on the different notions of knowledge.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.1 Take any f ∈ LFPτ and any f ′ ∈ τ such that f ⊆ f ′. Suppose no one
attacks f ′; then we are done as, by LFPτ’s definition, every non-attacked element of τ should be in
LFPτ . Suppose otherwise, and let t be one of such opens attacking f ′; it is enough to find a f ′′ ∈ LFPτ
attacking t, as then f ′ would be defended by someone in LFPτ and thus, by definition, f ′ would be
in LFPτ . Now, since t attacks f ′, it should also attack the stronger f (as required by֋’s definition);
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but then, since f is in LFPτ , it should be defended by someone in LFPτ , that is, there is a f ′′ in LFPτ
attacking t. This completes the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.2 The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma .1. Let M = (X ,E0,τE0 ,֋,V ) be a topological argumentation model. Then, for any f1, f2 ∈
LFPτ , f1, f2 ∈ LFPτ implies f1∩ f2 ∈ LFPτ if and only if for any t ∈ τ , if f1∩ f2֋ t, then t ∩ f = /0 for
some f ∈ LFPτ .
Proof. (⇒) From left to right, take arbitrary f1, f2 ∈ LFPτ . Suppose there is an open t ∈ τ such that t
attacks f1∩ f2 but is not in conflict with anybody in LFPτ . From the latter it follows that nobody in LFPτ
attacks t, and thus the attacked f1∩ f2 is not defended by LFPτ ; therefore, f1∩ f2 is not in LFPτ . (⇐)
From right to left, take arbitrary f1, f2 ∈ LFPτ . If there is no t ∈ τ such that f1 ∩ f2֋ t, then we are
done. Otherwise, take arbitrary t ∈ τ such that f1 ∩ f2֋ t. It implies that there is f ′ ∈ LFPτ such that
t ∩ f ′ = /0. Thus either f ′ attacks t or else t attacks f ′. The former case implies that there is f ′′ ∈ LFPτ
such that t֋ f ′′ by virtue of f ′’s membership in LFPτ ; together with the latter case, i.e. t֋ f ′, we
can conclude that there is f ∈ LFPτ such that t֋ f . Hence for any t ∈ τ such that f1∩ f2֋ t, there is
f ∈ LFPτ such that t֋ f , which implies that f1∩ f2 ∈ LFPτ .
Now, for proposition 3.2. The proof for transitivity and the relation being unambiguous, proceeds by
contraposition, so take any f1, f2 ∈ LFPτ such that f1∩ f2 is not in LFPτ . Then, by Lemma .1, there is an
open t ∈ τ who attacks f1∩ f2 (i.e., f1∩ f2֋ t) and who is not in conflict with elements of LFPτ (i.e.,
f ∈ LFPτ implies t ∩ f 6= /0). The goal is to show that֋ is not transitive.
Define t1, t2 and t3 as
t1 := f1∩ t, t2 := f2∩ t, t3 := f1∩ f2,
and note that none of them are empty. Note also that due to the fact that t attacks f1∩ f2 ( f1∩ f2֋ t), t
must be in conflict with f∩ f2 (( f1∩ f2)∩ t = /0); hence, t1∩ t2 = t2∩ t3 = t3∩ t1 = /0.
For transitivity, consider now the following twomutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive cases:(1) t1֋
t3 or t2֋ t3, (2) t1 6֋ t3 and t2 6֋ t3. In the first, assume the leftmost disjunct t1֋ t3; that, together
with t3֋ t (recall: t3 = f1 ∩ f2) and t1 6֋ t (as t1 ∩ t = f1 ∩ t 6= /0) shows that ֋ is not transitive. If
the rightmost disjunct t2֋ t3 is assumed, a similar reasoning yields t3֋ t and t2 6֋ t, and thus lack of
transitivity again.
Now the second case, which implies t3֋ t1 and t3֋ t2, as the ti are all in conflict. Since t1 and f2
are in conflict, at least one of them should attack the other. If t1֋ f2, then this together with t3֋ t1 and
t3 6֋ f2 (as t3∩t = f1∩ f2 6= /0, and thus they are not in conflict shows that֋ is not transitive. Otherwise,
f2֋ t1 should be the case; hence, since f2 is in LFPτ , it should be defended from t1 by some f ∈ LFPτ ,
that is, t1֋ f . But then we have f2֋ t1, t1֋ f and f2 6֋ f (since LFPτ) is conflict-free. Thus, again,
֋ is not transitive.
For the relation being unambiguous, consider two cases, t1֋ t2 or t2֋ t1. In the case of t1֋ t2, if
t2֋ t3, then no matter t1֋ t3 or t3֋ t1, it is not unambiguous. If t3֋ t2, then no matter t1֋ t3 or
t3֋ t1,֋ is not unambiguous. The proof for the case of t2֋ t1 follows a similar argument. Therefore,
we reach the conclusion that֋ cannot be unambiguous.
For symmetry, assume that֋ is symmetric. Observe that LFPτ = {t ∈ τ | ∀e ∈ E : e∩ t 6= /0}, which
is closed under conjunction.
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PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3.3 Take any t in JM . Since t is consistent with any e ∈ E , it is also consistent
with any open t ′ ∈ τ , that is, for any such t ′ we have t ∩ t ′ 6= /0. But then t is not attacked at all, and thus
it is defended by the empty set, i.e. t ∈ dτ( /0). Therefore, JM ⊆ dτ( /0).
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.1 Given a topological argumentation model, it is easy to build a point-wise
modally equivalent belief neighborhood model: it is enough to define the neighborhood function NB
as LFPτ plus all its element’s supersets (NB := {b ∈ 2X | f ⊆ b for some f ∈ LFPτ}). For the other
direction, given a belief neighborhood modelM= (X ,NB,V ), let MM = (X ,E0,τ ,֋NB ,V ) be the topo-
logical argumentation model that shares domain and atomic valuation withM, and in which the family of
pieces of evidence is given by the singletons in X (E0 := {{x} ∈ 2X | x ∈ X}) and therefore the generated
topology is the power set of the domain (τ = 2X ). Moreover, define the attack relation֋NB as
t֋NB t
′ iff
{
t ∩ t ′ = /0 and t /∈ NB when t ′ 6= /0
t = /0 when t ′ = /0
for every t, t ′ ∈ τ , so a non-empty t ′ attacks a non-empty t if and only if they are in conflict and t is not
in NB, and while the empty set does not attack non-empty sets, it is attacked by everybody (including
itself). It is easy to verify that this model is a topological argumentation model.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4.2 (⊇) Take any b ∈ NB. By֋NB’s definition, no element of τ who is in conflict
with b attacks it (i.e., there is no t ∈ τ such that b∩ t = /0 and b֋NB t); therefore, no one attacks b and
hence b ∈ LFPτ .
(⊆) Take an arbitrary t ∈ τ such that t /∈ NB. If t is not in conflict with any open in τ , then t must be
X , so X 6∈ NB, contradicting the fact that NB contains the unit. Hence, t should have a conflict with some
open, that is, there is at least one t ′ ∈ τ such that t∩ t ′ = /0. From this and֋NB’s definition it follows that
t ′ attacks t, t֋NB t
′.
If at least one of such t ′ is in NB, then it is also in LFPτ (the (⊇) case above), and thus the fact that
t ′ attacks t implies that t 6∈ LFPτ , as this set is conflict-free. Then we are done. Otherwise no such t ′ is
in NB, that is, every open in conflict with t is outside NB; in other words, no element of NB is in conflict
with t (b ∈ NB implies t ∩b 6= /0).
Define now the set s as the union of the non-t parts of every element of NB, that is, s :=
⋃
b∈NB(b\ t).
Since τ is the full power set, s is in τ . This s is in conflict with t (s∩ t = /0, by construction), but it is
consistent with all b ∈ NB (b∩ s 6= /0 for all such b, as otherwise the b′ ∈ NB in conflict with s would have
been a subset of t, and thus closure under supersets of NB would imply t ∈ NB, contradicting our initial
assumption). These two facts tells us that we have found an open s ∈ τ that attacks t (t֋NB s, from the
first fact, t /∈ NB and֋NB’s definition) but it is not attacked by anyone in NB (b ∈ NB implies s 6֋NB b,
from the second fact and ֋NB’s definition). Moreover, it attacks every open not in NB with whom it
has conflict (x /∈ NB implies x∩ s = /0, again from֋NB’s definition). Thus, s(1) attacks everybody in τ
that is not in NB, and (2) is not attacked by anybody in NB; hence no one outside NB can be protected
by NB against s, which means that dτ(NB) = NB. Together with the fact that NB ⊆ LFPτ , it implies that
NB = LFPτ . In particular, since t 6∈ NB, we get the required t 6∈ LFPτ .
References
[1] Sergei N. Artemov (2008): The Logic of Justification. The Review of Symbolic Logic 1(4), pp. 477–513,
doi:10.1017/S1755020308090060.
502 Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures
[2] Sergei N. Artemov & Elena Nogina (2005): Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic. Journal of Logic
and Computation 15(6), pp. 1059–1073, doi:10.1093/logcom/exi053.
[3] Alexandru Baltag, Nick Bezhanishvili, Aybüke Özgün & Sonja Smets (2013): The Topology of Belief, Belief
Revision and Defeasible Knowledge. In Davide Grossi, Olivier Roy & Huaxin Huang, editors: Logic, Ra-
tionality, and Interaction: 4th International Workshop, LORI 2013, Hangzhou, China, October 9-12, 2013,
Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 27–40, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-40948-6_3.
[4] Alexandru Baltag, Nick Bezhanishvili, Aybüke Özgün & Sonja Smets (2015): The topological the-
ory of belief. Technical Report PP-2015-18, ILLC, University of Amsterdam. Available at
https://www.illc.uva.nl/Research/Publications/Reports/PP-2015-18.text.pdf.
[5] Alexandru Baltag, Nick Bezhanishvili, Aybüke Özgün & Sonja Smets (2016): Justified Belief and the
Topology of Evidence. In Jouko Väänänen, Åsa Hirvonen & Ruy de Queiroz, editors: Logic, Lan-
guage, Information, and Computation: 23rd International Workshop, WoLLIC 2016, Puebla, Mex-
ico, August 16-19th, 2016. Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 83–103,
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-52921-8_6.
[6] Alexandru Baltag, Virginie Fiutek & Sonja Smets (2016): Beliefs and Evidence in Justi-
fication Models. In S. Demri L. Beklemishev & A. Mate, editors: Proceedings of Ad-
vances in Modal Logic, College Publications, Oxford, UK, pp. 156–176. Available at
http://www.aiml.net/volumes/volume11/Baltag-Fiutek-Smets.pdf.
[7] Alexandru Baltag, Bryan Renne & Sonja Smets (2012): The Logic of Justified Belief Change, Soft Evi-
dence and Defeasible Knowledge. In C.-H. Luke Ong & Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz, editors: Logic, Lan-
guage, Information and Computation - 19th International Workshop, WoLLIC 2012, Buenos Aires, Ar-
gentina, September 3-6, 2012. Proceedings, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7456, Springer, pp. 168–190,
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32621-9_13.
[8] Alexandru Baltag, Bryan Renne & Sonja Smets (2014): The Logic of Justified Belief, Explicit Knowledge and
Conclusive Evidence. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 165(1), pp. 49–81, doi:10.1016/j.apal.2013.07.005.
[9] Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008): Probabilistic dynamic belief revision. Synthese 165(2), p. 179,
doi:10.1007/s11229-008-9369-8.
[10] Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets (2008): A qualitative theory of dynamic interactive belief revision. Texts
in logic and games 3, pp. 9–58. Available at http://www.vub.ac.be/CLWF/SS/chapter.pdf.
[11] Johan van Benthem, David Fernández Duque & Eric Pacuit (2014): Evidence and plausibility in neighbor-
hood structures. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 165(1), pp. 106–133, doi:10.1016/j.apal.2013.07.007.
[12] Johan van Benthem& Eric Pacuit (2011): Dynamic Logics of Evidence-Based Beliefs. Studia Logica 99(1-3),
pp. 61–92, doi:10.1007/s11225-011-9347-x.
[13] Oliver Board (2004): Dynamic interactive epistemology. Games and Economic Behaviour 49(1), pp. 49–80,
doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.006.
[14] Martin W. A. Caminada & Dov M. Gabbay (2009): A Logical Account of Formal Argumentation. Studia
Logica 93(2-3), p. 109, doi:10.1007/s11225-009-9218-x.
[15] Brian F. Chellas (1980): Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Eng. ; New
York, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511621192.
[16] Sylvie Coste-Marquis, Caroline Devred, Sébastien Konieczny, Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex & Pierre
Marquis (2007): On the Merging of Dung’s Argumentation Systems. Artificial Intelligence 171(10), pp.
730–753, doi:10.1016/j.artint.2007.04.012.
[17] Jon Doyle (1979): A Truth Maintenance System. Artificial Intelligence 12(3), pp. 231–272,
doi:10.1016/0004-3702(79)90008-0.
[18] Phan Minh Dung (1995): On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmono-
tonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. Artificial intelligence 77, pp. 321–357,
doi:10.1016/0004-3702(94)00041-X.
C. Shi, S. Smets & F.R. Velázquez-Quesada 503
[19] Ulle Endriss & Umberto Grandi (2017): Graph Aggregation. Artificial Intelligence 245, pp. 86–114,
doi:10.1016/j.artint.2017.01.001.
[20] Richard Foley (2009): Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis. In Franz Huber & Christoph
Schmidt-Petri, editors: Degrees of Belief, Synthese Library 342, Springer Netherlands, pp. 37–47,
doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_2.
[21] Davide Grossi (2013): Abstract argument games via modal logic. Synthese 190, pp. 5–29,
doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0237-1.
[22] Davide Grossi & Wiebe van der Hoek (2014): Justified Beliefs by Justified Arguments. In: Proceedings of
the Fourteenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, AAAI
Press, pp. 131–140. Available at http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/KR/KR14/paper/view/7997.
[23] Jaakko Hintikka (1962): Knowledge and Belief. Cornell University Press.
[24] Kevin T. Kelly (1996): The logic of reliable inquiry. Oxford University Press.
[25] Thomas Kelly (2016): Evidence. In Edward N. Zalta, editor: The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, winter 2016 edition, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/evidence/.
[26] Johan de Kleer (1986): An Assumption-Based TMS. Artificial Intelligence 28(2), pp. 127–162,
doi:10.1016/0004-3702(86)90080-9.
[27] Dominik Klein, Norbert Gratzl & Olivier Roy (2015): Introspection, Normality and Agglom-
eration. In: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction, Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, pp. 195–206,
doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48561-3_16.
[28] Keith Lehrer (1990): Theory of Knowledge, 1st edition. Routledge.
[29] Wolfgang Lenzen (1980): Glauben, Wissen und Wahrscheinlichkeit: Systeme der epistemischen Logik.
Springer, doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-8594-0. Google-Books-ID: 6mwIAQAAIAAJ.
[30] John-Jules Ch. Meyer & Wiebe van Der Hoek (1995): Epistemic Logic for AI and Computer Science. Cam-
bridge University Press, New York, N.Y., U.S.A., doi:10.1017/CBO9780511569852.
[31] Richard Montague (1970): Universal Grammar. Theoria 36(3), pp. 373–398,
doi:10.1111/j.1755-2567.1970.tb00434.x.
[32] George Pappas (2014): Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Jus-
tification. In Edward N. Zalta, editor: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, fall 2014 edition, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. Available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justep-intext/.
[33] François Schwarzentruber, Srdjan Vesic & Tjitze Rienstra (2012): Building an Epistemic Logic for Argumen-
tation. In Luis Fariñas del Cerro, Andreas Herzig & Jérôme Mengin, editors: Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- 13th European Conference, JELIA 2012, Toulouse, France, September 26-28, 2012. Proceedings, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 7519, Springer, pp. 359–371, doi:10.1007/978-3-642-33353-8_28.
[34] Dana Scott (1970): Advice on modal logic. In Karel Lambert, editor: Philosophical Problems in Logic,
Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, pp. 143–173, doi:10.1007/978-94-010-3272-8_7.
[35] Wolfgang Spohn (1988): Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In
William Leonard Harper & Brian Skyrms, editors: Causation in decision, belief change, and statistics: Pro-
ceedings of the Irvine Conference on Probability and Causation, The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy
of Science 42, Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 105–134, doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2865-7_6.
[36] Jan van Eijck & Bryan Renne (2014): Belief as Willingness to Bet. arXiv:1412.5090 [cs]. Available at
https://arxiv.org/abs/1412.5090.
[37] Steven Vickers (1989): Topology via Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
